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Abstract 
Online entertainment shopping, normally supported by the pay-to-bid auction mechanism, represents 
an innovative business model in e-commerce. Because the unique selling mechanism combines 
features of shopping and online auction, consumers expect both monetary return and entertainment 
value from their participation. We propose a dynamic structural model to analyze consumer 
behaviors on entertainment shopping websites. The model captures the consumer learning process, 
based both on individual participation experiences and also on observational learning of historical 
auction information. We estimate the model using a large data set from an online entertainment 
shopping website. Results show that consumers’ initial participation incentives mainly come from a 
significant overestimation of the entertainment value and an obvious underestimation of the auction 
competition. Both types of learning contribute to a general decreasing participation trend among 
consumers over time. Our model provides both a theoretical explanation and empirical evidence of 
the consumer churn issue. It further identifies two groups of consumers with different risk 
characteristics: One group is risk-averse and quits using the website before effective learning takes 
place, while the other group exhibits risk-seeking behavior and overly commits to the auction games. 
Based on the estimated parameters of the model, we perform counterfactual analyses to evaluate the 
effects of policy changes on consumers’ participation behaviors. We discuss several important 
design implications and recommend strategies for building a sustainable business model in the 
entertainment shopping industry. 
Keywords: Dynamic Structural Model, Consumer Learning, Pay-to-Bid Auction, Bayesian 
Statistics, Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
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1 Introduction 
The proliferation of e-commerce has inspired the 
development of many new forms of online retail 
mechanisms, among which “entertainment shopping” 
represents one recent innovation. As the name implies, 
entertainment shopping combines “entertainment” 
with “online shopping.” It sells products using a type 
of pay-to-bid auction (also known as bidding-fee 
auction or penny auction) to engage players in online 
shopping tasks. The auction design leverages people’s 
natural desires for socializing, competition, 
achievement, status, and self-expression. It 
provides an interactive shopping environment to 
effectively integrate into retail shopping 
consumers’ utilitarian and hedonic motivations.  
According to Alexa’s web traffic rankings, 
pennyauctionwatch.com currently tracks the top 50 
active entertainment shopping websites worldwide. 
DealDash.com, the US-based e-commerce company 




that operates the longest-running bidding-fee auction 
website, allows bidders to bid on brand new products, 
including electronics, household items, gift cards, and 
more. Beezid.com is a Canada-based entertainment 
auction site that features auctions for designer 
handbags, Apple products, and other desirable 
consumer products and electronics. MadBid.com is a 
UK-based e-commerce and online auction site. This 
fast-growing shopping site has attracted more than one 
million users from across Europe and around the world.  
The pay-to-bid auction is different from other 
traditional online auction models such as eBay 
auctions. As the US entertainment shopping site 
QuiBids.com claims, the new auction format is “a 
unique, exciting way to rejuvenate a century-old 
traditional auction in the digital era.” A typical auction 
on entertainment shopping websites works as follows. 
Every auction starts at $0.00, and each bid normally 
costs the bidder $0.50-$1.00 and raises the auction 
price by only $0.01, thus the name “penny auction.” 
The auction adopts a soft ending rule. Every bid 
restarts the auction countdown clock from a maximum 
of 10-20 seconds (the timing is not uniform from 
auction to auction).1 If no new bids are placed before 
the clock runs out, the last bidder wins the auction. The 
winner has the right to buy the item for the final 
price—typically 60-90% off the retail price. Further 
details about the auction design and comparison across 
different websites are provided in Appendix B. 
Although the auction design elements, such as the cost 
of bidding, the incremental price increase, and the 
countdown clock time, can vary from one website to 
another, all websites share a common feature—they 
collect revenue from the bidding fees paid by all 
participants. The auction turns shopping into a 
competitive bidding game, so that the business model 
combines the features of both auctions and 
entertainment. The winning bidders obtain the 
merchandise at huge savings, and all losing bidders 
experience the excitement of potential “winning,” which 
they deem worthy of the bidding fees they pay in auctions. 
However, because most consumers pay the rather 
large bidding fee and still lose the auction, some 
analysts have criticized this model as a type of 
gambling, similar to lotteries (Platt, Price, & 
Tappen, 2013). Also, Wang & Xu (2016) find 
evidence that the majority of the participants quickly 
quit using the entertainment shopping websites after 
losing money, suggesting significant consumer 
churn issues. Decreasing consumer confidence has 
curtailed the overall growth of the industry, casting 
doubts as to whether the pay-to-bid auction-based 
entertainment shopping represents a sustainable 
business model. In fact, many of the early movers in 
                                                     
1 On QuiBids.com, the timer that resets to a maximum of 10 
seconds is called a speed auction. 
this space, such as Swoopo.com and BigDeal.com, 
failed after a short period of operation. 
Motivated by this paradox that a seemingly attractive 
business model cannot profit in a long run because of 
the unusual consumer churns, we develop a model to 
analyze entertainment shopping from the perspective 
of participating consumers. We aim to answer the 
following research questions: What are the main 
driving factors that motivate consumers to participate 
in the entertainment shopping website? Why would 
consumers churn on these websites? Do consumers 
learn from their repeated participation? If so, what 
types of learning are possible and what effects does 
learning have on consumers’ decisions to participate in 
auctions? From the website design perspective, what 
policy changes would be effective to better engage 
consumers and create a sustainable business model?  
We believe consumers are attracted to the websites not 
only because they expect monetary payoff, but also 
because they perceive considerable entertainment 
value. Consumers that repeatedly participate in online 
auctions for different products are able to learn through 
their own experiences and update beliefs about the 
perceived entertainment value. They can also learn by 
observing the historical auction information and by 
becoming more informed about auction competition. 
We thus propose a utility-based structural model of 
consumer learning to gain insights into consumers’ 
dynamic participation and churn behaviors on the 
entertainment shopping websites.  
We estimate our model using data collected from a 
leading entertainment auction website, on which we 
tracked the bidding behaviors of users for more than 
three months. We found that the consumers’ initial 
participation incentives mainly come from an 
overestimation of the entertainment value and an 
underestimation of the auction competition. Both self-
learning and observational learning are effective and 
help consumers discover the true value of 
entertainment, form correct expectations about auction 
competition, and contribute to a general decreasing 
participation trend among consumers over time. Our 
model provides both a theoretical explanation and 
empirical evidence of the consumer churn issue. 
Interestingly, our model identifies two groups of 
consumers with different risk characteristics. The first 
group of consumers are risk-averse—they are enticed 
by the fun shopping opportunities but quit the website 
quickly, even before they learn the true entertainment 
value for themselves. The second group of consumers, 
in contrast, are more persistent in their participation 
and exhibit risk-seeking preferences. This finding is 
consistent with theories related to wars of attrition and 




escalation of commitment, thus confirming that 
entertainment shopping does induce some sort of 
gambling behavior. Through policy simulations, we 
offer several recommendations for managing 
consumer churn on websites and discuss plausible 
mechanisms for building a sustainable business model.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 briefly reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes our data and presents some initial evidence. 
Section 4 proposes a structural model of consumer 
decision-making. Section 5 describes the model 
estimation method. Section 6 presents the empirical 
results, robustness checks, and additional tests of the 
model. Section 7 conducts policy simulations and 
discusses their implications. Section 8 concludes the 
study with future research directions. 
2 Related Literature 
In this section, we first review literature in the general 
context of Internet auctions. We then focus on pay-to-bid 
auction-based entertainment shopping as an emerging e-
business model. Finally, we review consumer learning 
models in various e-commerce applications.  
Internet auctions are an important selling mechanism 
used by many retailers who sell products online (Sun, 
2010; Bockstedt & Goh, 2012). Many studies have 
focused on eBay, the leading auction marketplace 
selling a broad variety of goods and services (Bapna, 
Jank, & Shmueli, 2008; Hong & Pavlou, 2014). 
Because the online auction imposes social competition 
on bidders, it elicits a more exciting shopping 
experience than fixed-price purchases. For example, 
consumers might respond emotionally to 
environmental stimuli during the auction process, such 
as excitement, arousal (Teubner, Adam, & Riordan, 
2015), impulse buying (Adam, Krämer, & Weinhardt, 
2012), escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976; 
Malmendier & Lee, 2011; McGee, 2013) and winner’s 
curse (Easley, Wood, & Barkataki, 2011), the 
reference price effect (Popkowski Leszczyc, Qiu, & 
He, 2009), and strategic exit using the buy-now option 
(Angst, Agarwal, & Kuruzovich, 2008; Reiner, Natter, 
& Skiera, 2014), etc. Specifically, Ku, Malhotra, and 
Murnighan (2005) identify the “auction fever” 
phenomenon, in which bidders engage in a fierce battle 
to win the item in an auction because of competitive 
arousal. Adam, Krämer, and Müller (2015) further show 
that social competition drives the auction fever 
phenomenon, and that bidders’ arousal increases in 
auctions characterized by high time pressure. In addition, 
Goes, Karuga, and Tripathi (2010) find that bidders form 
and update their willingness-to-pay by learning from the 
participation experience in sequential online auctions. 
A new form of Internet auction is the pay-to-bid 
auction currently adopted by many entertainment 
shopping websites (Augenblick, 2016), which 
represents a recent business innovation in e-commerce. 
Hinnosaar (2016) shows that a high variance of 
outcomes is common for pay-to-bid auctions. Byers, 
Mitzenmacher, and Zervas (2010) show that the 
information asymmetries across participants increase 
auction duration and produce excess profits. Platt et al. 
(2013) incorporate risk-loving preferences of users to 
explain excess revenue in such auctions. Augenblick 
(2016) incorporates bidders’ regret over past bidding 
costs into the classic risk-neutral auction models to 
improve prediction accuracy. In addition, Wang and 
Xu (2016) find evidence that entertainment 
shopping websites might lose money to 
sophisticated participants, but find that the gain 
from the least experienced bidders far exceeds the 
loss. Their finding suggests that players learn from 
their repeated participation experiences. 
Nevertheless, how learning affects consumers’ 
choices in different types of bidding games and how 
the learning effectiveness affects their website 
participation remain challenging research questions. 
Consumer behavior modeling has gained increasing 
attention in marketing and information systems 
disciplines. Prior research has shown that consumer 
learning occurs naturally in various complex decision-
making environments. Erdem and Keane (1996) treat 
the use experience of consumers and advertisement as 
two noisy signals in consumers’ process of learning the 
attributes of a new product. Erdem, Keane, and Sun 
(2008) further incorporate product price and 
advertisement frequency to enrich the consumer 
learning model. Narayanan and Manchanda (2009) 
apply a Bayesian learning model to account for the 
heterogeneous learning rates of individual physicians 
for new prescription medicines. In addition to new 
products, learning models have been developed in 
other application contexts, such as service quality 
learning and usage learning in the service industry 
(Iyengar, Ansari, & Gupta, 2007), user content 
generation and consumption behavior in the mobile 
context (Ghose & Han, 2014), online reviews (Zhao, 
Yang, Narayan, & Zhao, 2013), and crowdsourcing 
(Huang, Singh, & Srinivasan, 2014). These researches 
contribute to better understanding consumer behaviors 
under various uncertain environments. Following this 
stream of research, we propose two learning 
mechanisms in our model—self-experienced 
entertainment value learning and observational 
learning based on historical prices. In addition, we take 
into account consumers’ risk attribute in their decision-
making. We develop a dynamic structural model using 
Bayesian learning to analyze the participation behavior 
of consumers in entertainment shopping.  
Various studies in consumer research have confirmed 
that shopping experiences produce both utilitarian and 
hedonic values (Holbrook & Hirschman, 1982), 
especially in online auctions (Angst et al., 2008; Adam 




et al., 2012). Hedonic value refers to the enjoyment 
derived by users from engaging, while utilitarian 
values are directly related to the shopping outcome 
(Babin, Darden, & Griffin, 1994). Van der Heijden 
(2004) argue that perceived enjoyment is extremely 
important in web systems, games, and systems for 
home and leisure purposes. Ariely & Simonson (2003) 
also show that the hedonic value derived from fun and 
excitement is an important factor leading to the success 
of Internet auctions. In the entertainment shopping 
context, we simultaneously consider both the 
utilitarian and hedonic values consumers derive from 
their repeated participation in pay-to-bid auctions. We 
examine how learning occurs over time, how learning 
dynamics affect consumers’ choice of participation in 
different types of product auctions, and how their risk 
preferences influence their changing interests in the 
online entertainment shopping environment.  
3 Data and Initial Evidence 
3.1 Data Description 
We collected data from one of the earliest leading 
entertainment auction websites in China, 5Pai.com. 
The website sells a large number of consumer 
electronics and other popular products typically found 
in online retail stores. Figure B-1 in Appendix B shows 
a screen shot for 5Pai to illustrate its selling mechanism. 
Figure B-2 compares other similar websites in China and 
the United States. Since these websites have adopted 
identical selling mechanisms, insights gained from this 
study are directly applicable to other pay-to-bid auction-
based entertainment shopping environments.  
We tracked live auctions on the website from October 
19, 2011 to January 21, 2012 to collect information 
about auction-level dynamics and bidder-level details.2 
During each day of this period, the website provided a 
relatively stable number of auctions and attracted a 
steady stream of newly registered users. We present 
detailed descriptive statistics for different product 
auctions and the corresponding auctioneer revenue in 
Appendix C. There are 21,463 auctions covering 586 
unique products in the data set. The large number of 
different products and the low repetition for most 
auctioned products limit us to analyze consumers’ 
decision-making toward a specific product. We thus 
choose to focus on consumers’ participation behaviors 
at the product-category level.  
                                                     
2  We use the terms “consumers”, “bidders”, and “users” 
interchangeably in this paper. 
3 Different websites define “free” auctions in different ways. 
In our case, the bidding is free, but the final winner still has 
to pay the auction closing price for purchasing the product. 
According to the website navigation, we classify the 
product auctions into three paid auction categories: 
virtual products (e.g., top-up cards and bid packs), 
general merchandise (e.g., home daily supplies and 
electronic appliances), and digital products (e.g., 
tablets and mobile phones). We separated virtual 
products from physical products because they have 
distinct features that might lead to different consumer 
behaviors. For example, the auction for virtual 
products (e.g., top-up telephone cards) usually only 
last for minutes and can be immediately cashed out 
upon winning. The immediate gratification of virtual 
products might excite and motivate users. For physical 
products, we further separated digital products from 
general merchandise because digital products are some 
of the most popular auctions, and the same digital 
product auction is more frequently offered on websites 
than are other physical products. Furthermore, digital 
product auctions often take longer—auctions for 
iPhones, for example, might take hours or even a day 
to complete, thereby incurring high time and cognitive 
costs for users. We also believe the consumer learning 
rates in the three product categories differ. This 
classification resulted in a relatively balanced sample 
of 5,000 to 7,000 auctions in each category.  
In addition, the website offers free auctions in various 
product categories (e.g., CNY10 face value top-up 
card) to attract and engage users. The website 
distinguishes free auctions from other product auctions 
using a “free” label, which means that users can use 
free auction bids to participate in such auctions.3 We 
view free auctions as the fourth type of auction because 
they require bidders to use free, rather than paid, bids. 
During the three-month period of our data collection, 
about one out of six auctions were free auctions. Table 
1 provides the descriptive statistics for the three types 
of paid auctions and the free auction. 
We observed that digital products have higher retail 
prices, higher auction closing prices, longer duration, 
and higher website profits than the other categories. 
This category has apparently attracted a significant 
number of bidders who contribute substantially to 
website revenues. The high average auction closing 
price of digital products indicates intense competition 
in the auctions, and the longer auction duration implies 
higher cognitive and time costs for bidders. closing 
prices and the accurate inference of the expected 
payoff from the auctions difficult for users.  
On DealDash.com, bidders have to pay for the bids they 
place as they participate in “free” auctions. In contrast, if a 
bidder wins an item, DealDash waives the final auction 
closing price. 




Table 1. Summary Statistics for Auctions 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
In addition, the large variance suggests that auction 
outcomes are highly uncertain, making the estimation 
of auction. Note that, although the auction closing 
prices and the auction duration of the virtual products 
are similar to those of the general merchandise, the 
average retail price of the virtual products is much 
lower than that of the general merchandise. Therefore, 
the website profit for virtual products is higher than it 
is for general merchandise. 
3.2 Sample Auctions and Users 
During our observation period, the website had 32,070 
active users.4 Our data show that most registered users 
were only active for a short period of time. To 
eliminate the concern that users who registered early 
might have obtained more information than those who 
registered late, we randomly selected a sample of users 
who registered on a typical weekday in October 2011, 
so that these users had the same prior information set. 
In Section 6.3 we show that our model estimation and 
insights are robust against other user samples. 
Figure 1 shows the logarithm (log) of the number of 
auctions and the log of the number of bids placed by 
all users and the selected sample users, respectively. 
We observed a power law distribution, in which a few 
                                                     
4 We define active users as those who have registered on the 
website and have participated in at least one auction. There 
users participated in many auctions and placed a large 
number of bids, while the majority of users 
participated in only a handful of auctions and placed 
few bids. Our sample of users exhibited similar 
participation patterns as the general population, 
thereby confirming that our selected sample 
reasonably represents the population.  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
registered users and the sample users (in parentheses), 
respectively. On average, each registered user on the 
website has participated in 5.89 auctions, of which 
only 0.5 were winning auctions; these numbers 
indicate high competition and a low probability of 
winning. We further define the active bidding window 
as the number of days between the first and last 
participation of a registered user. The mean active 
bidding window per user was 4.53 days, indicating that 
users stayed active for only a few days, thus reflecting 
limited participation on the website. The mean and 
variance of the users participating in free auctions were 
relatively smaller than the mean and variance of the 
users in paid auctions because the number of free 
auction bids awarded to or earned by each user is 
limited. The significant variations in the number of paid 
auctions indicate strong heterogeneity across users. 
are users who have registered on the website but never 
participated in any auction. 





Figure 1. Histogram of Log Numbers of Auctions and Bids 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for All (Sample) Registered Users 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total number of auctions per user 5.89(5.21) 18.66(10.79) 1(1) 822(77) 
Total number of paid auctions per user 4.12(3.36) 16.23(8.43) 0(0) 749(66) 
Total number of free auctions per user 1.78(1.85) 3.53(5.50) 0(0) 150(76) 
Total number of winning auctions per user 0.50(0.33) 2.82(1.39) 0(0) 61(11) 
Active bidding window per user 4.53(7.66) 12.14(18.12) 0(0) 91(85) 
Note: Numbers outside the parentheses are for all 32,070 registered users in our data set. Numbers inside the parentheses are for the selected 
241 users who registered on a typical weekday. 
3.3 Initial Evidence of Consumer 
Participation 
What participation patterns do we observe for 
registered users? Because only paid auctions affect the 
website revenue, we focus on paid auction 
participation. Figure 2 presents the number of paid 
sample users per day and the sample users’ dynamic 
participation patterns for the three types of paid 
auctions, respectively. We see that both the number of 
paid users and the number of paid auctions in which 
they participated were significantly higher on the 
registration day. The level of participation decayed 
over time and stabilized around zero after a month.  
Do users learn from their past experiences to improve 
their bidding skills? To measure a user’s skill in the 
auction, we define profit per bid as the total net profit 
the user has gained until day t divided by the number 
of bids the user has placed up to day t. We conducted 
regression analysis on the profit per bid using the 
number of auctions in which a user has participated and 
using the log number of auctions provided on the 
website, controlling for the auction type and the 
individual fixed effects. Table D-1 in Appendix D 
shows the regression results. We find that the number 
of auction participations and of observed auctions by a 
user did not significantly affect the average profit per 
bid of the user. Users thus seem not to gain effective 
bidding skills over time. 
Population
































































Figure 2. Daily Number of Paid Sample Users and Participation in Paid Auctions 
Consequently, we ask two questions: What aspects of 
learning are possible? How do users learn from their 
experience and observation? We developed a structural 
model to explain the dynamic participation behaviors 
of users, which enables us to better understand the 
users’ decision-making processes regarding their 
participation on entertainment shopping websites. 
4 The Model 
Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, & Porac (1981) assert 
that people can gain extrinsic rewards (e.g., monetary 
awards and prizes) when they participate in 
competitive events. They also can gain a more 
intrinsic, personal, and emotional reward from 
competitively derived pleasure. On entertainment 
shopping websites, consumers derive a positive 
utilitarian value by winning an auction and obtaining a 
desired product at a huge discount. The direct 
monetary return from winning (i.e., the savings) and 
the bidding fees paid in the participated auctions 
represent the tangible utility gain/loss.  
In addition to the tangible values, consumers derive 
intangible rewards, which are more subjective and 
personal and result more from fun and excitement in 
the process than from simply completing a 
shopping task. According to Adam et al. (2012), 
Consumers might be interested more in having 
such experiences than in merely acquiring 
products. We term such intangible rewards from 
the auction participation the “entertainment value.”  
Because a bidder needs to make a bidding decision 
within a very short countdown clock window 
(usually within 10 seconds), the high time pressure 
will impose a high cognitive cost for the consumer. 
In addition, some popular auctions typically take 
hours to complete; thus consumers must invest 
significant time and effort in continuously 
monitoring the auction process. We term this 
intangible cost the “cognitive cost.”  
In this study, we assume that consumers derive utility 
from both the tangible monetary return and the 
intangible nonmonetary entertainment value and 
cognitive cost. We also consider the risk attitude of 
consumers in the structural model. 
4.1 User Utility  
We consider a number of users indexed by 𝑖𝑖 =
1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 who choose to participate in paid auctions 
with category 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3  over the time period 𝑡𝑡 =
1,2, … ,𝑇𝑇. At the beginning of each day 𝑡𝑡, users decide 
whether to participate in a specific type of auction 
based on their expected utility. 
First, a user’s utility can be affected by his or her 
current financial status and past participation 
experience. We use 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 , 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]  to depict a 
vector of the user- and time-specific covariates, 
including a user’s cumulative wealth up to day 𝑡𝑡 (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ), 
earnings from the previous day (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ), and a loss 
indicator (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) capturing the user’s continuous failures 
in the auctions. Both 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙  are affected by the 
bidding fees sunk cost and the auction outcomes from 
the user’s past auction participation. The loss indicator 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is used to measure whether frequent past failures 
would cause competitive arousal which might increase 
the bidder’s likelihood to participate in future auctions. 
Second, regardless of the auction outcome, 
participating in the auction is seen as an adventure and 
has a potential entertainment and emotional worth. 
Thus, the entertainment effect is considered a key 
design feature of hedonic information systems (Van 
der Heijden, 2004). We assume each user 𝑖𝑖  has a 
perceived website entertainment value 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  at time 𝑡𝑡 , 
which reflects the user’s overall evaluation of the 





































entertainment shopping environment. A number of 
factors, including fair auction rules, large number and 
variety of products, rich functionalities, friendly user 
interface, automatic bidding tools, easy account 
management, active online community, and other 
aspects of web design might positively affect the 
website entertainment value. The overall website 
entertainment value can be reflected by the steady 
state of user participation. 
Third, various types of auctions might bring different 
participation experiences to individual users and 
require different levels of cognitive effort (Camerer, 
Ho, & Chong, 2004). For example, due to the soft 
ending rule of the auction, digital products such as 
iPhones might take hours or even a day to complete, 
thereby incurring high time and cognitive cost for 
users. In contrast, the auction for virtual products such 
as top-up telephone cards can be completed within 
minutes. We thus introduce a category-specific 
cognitive cost parameter, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , to reflect the 
nonmonetary, psychological participation cost 
including the average time and effort invested in 
different types of auctions. This set of parameters can 
be identified relatively to each other based on users’ 
heterogeneous participation patterns in the different 
categories of product auctions. 
In addition, each user might infer the level of auction 
competition from the observed historical auction 
closing prices. Because we are interested in users’ 
decision-making at the category level, we aggregate 
auction closing prices 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 in each category. The mean 
and variance of the auction closing price, which can be 
identified through the historical auction closing price 
series, represent the expected competition and the 
uncertainty involved in the specific auction category.  
Let 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  be the utility that user 𝑖𝑖  obtained from 
participating in category 𝑗𝑗  auction on day 𝑡𝑡 . We 
specify the utility function as follows: 
 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 +
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔′ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 (1) 
The first two terms capture the individual and category 
level expected intangible values that we infer from our 
data. The third term captures the user’s perceived price 
                                                     
5 Such quadratic utility form is widely used in the literature 
to model uncertainties (Erdem et al., 2008; Ghose & Han, 
2014). Mathematically, variabilities in utility can be captured 
effect of auction competition from observable 
historical price information. The fourth (squared) term 
measures the risk preferences of the user in response to 
auction competition. 5  The fifth term is a vector of 
covariates that capture the tangible monetary gains and 
losses from the user’s own past auction participation 
experiences. Finally, the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  captures the 
user choice-specific random shock at time 𝑡𝑡 . These 
errors can be any promotional activities or reminder 
emails that are unknown to the researchers but that can 
influence the choice users make about the types of 
auctions in which they would like to participate.  
Our model allows for user heterogeneity by assuming 
different latent segments (Desarbo, Kamakura, & 
Wedel, 2006; Erdem et al., 2008; Ghose & Han, 2014). 
For each latent segment 𝑔𝑔, parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 measures the 
effect of the auction competition, and 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 captures the 
risk preference of users toward uncertainty in the 
auction outcome. The perceived auction competition 
and risk level would affect a user’s expected monetary 
payoff. In addition, parameter vector 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔 measures how 
the past monetary returns and auction outcomes 
(expressed in the vector covariates) affect the user’s 
perceived utility for the 𝑔𝑔th latent segment.  
At the beginning of each day, users decide whether to 
participate in any type of auction based on their 
expected utility. Each user has a prior belief about the 
perceived entertainment value and the auction 
competition. Users are initially uncertain about these 
values when they first registered on the website. As time 
goes by, they learn through both direct participation 
experiences and indirect observations on the website. 
Figure 3 illustrates the belief update framework.  
Two types of learning occur simultaneously. First, 
consumers learn through their own participation in 
auctions. These personal experiences provide the 
consumers with signals to update their belief about the 
entertainment value of the site. Their utilitarian payoffs 
such as monetary gains and losses from auction 
participation are also updated. Second, consumers can 
actively track newly completed auctions on the website. 
The observed closing price signals help the users update 
their beliefs and infer the level of auction competition. 
in the expected utility functional expression (see Equation 4 
in Section 4.5). 





Figure 3. User Learning Through Direct Experiences and Indirect Observations 
As seen in Figure 3, both the monetary and experience-
related terms and the beliefs about entertainment value 
and perceived auction competition affect a user’s 
expected utility. In the following, we discuss our 
measures and implement the learning process using 
a Bayesian learning model. 
4.2 Monetary Gain and Continuous Loss 
Two monetary terms enter a user’s utility function. The 
user’s cumulative wealth up to day 𝑡𝑡 , 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 , is the 
user’s account balance at the beginning of day 𝑡𝑡. The 
user’s earning in the previous day, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 , is calculated 
as the total revenue (retail prices minus auction 
closing prices for winners and zero for losers) minus 
the sunk cost during the previous day. We take the log 
transformation of the cumulative balance, revenue, 
and sunk cost plus 1 to rescale the measure and to 
avoid infinitely negative values.  
We also include a consecutive loss factor. The 
escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976; Malmendier & 
Lee, 2011; McGee, 2013) and the sunk cost fallacy 
(Augenblick, 2016; French & McCormick, 1984) 
together have been used to justify people’s increased 
investment of money and time in a decision. It refers 
to the phenomenon that, based on the cumulative prior 
investment, and despite new evidence suggesting that 
the cost of continuing the decision outweighs the 
expected benefit, the decision maker still “throws good 
                                                     
6 Similar to our model, Ghose & Han (2014) assume that 
users’ content match value on the mobile Internet is drawn 
money after bad.” Because each time a bidder loses an 
auction, he or she incurs some sunk costs (i.e., 
nonnegligible biddings fees), we want to evaluate 
whether bidders make poor decisions by using their 
past failures to justify their continued involvement. 
Thus, we use a loss indicator 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 to indicate whether 
the user has lost a fixed number of auctions 
consecutively. In our main model estimation, the 
indicator is 1 if a user loses 15 consecutive auctions; 
otherwise, it is 0. The escalation of commitment could 
be confirmed with a significant and positive estimate 
of the coefficient for 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The values for 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖1𝑐𝑐 , 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖1𝑙𝑙 , and 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖1at the beginning of day 1 are all zero.  
4.3 User Learning About Entertainment 
Value 
We assume users have a heterogeneous prior belief 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖0 
about the entertainment value when they first register 
on the website. This prior belief is normally distributed 
with mean 𝐸𝐸0 and variance 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸0
2 , so 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖0~𝑁𝑁�𝐸𝐸0,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸0
2 �.  
After registration, users can participate in both free and 
paid auctions on the website. By experiencing both 
types of auctions, users obtain different signals about 
the website entertainment value. The free auction 
experience signal is considered more precise than the 
paid auction signal because the bidding in the former 
generally does not involve real money, allowing users 
to discover quickly the true entertainment value. 6  
from a distribution. Users are initially uncertain about the 




















We define user 𝑖𝑖’s direct experience through the 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖ℎ 
paid auction and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖ℎ  free auction on day 𝑡𝑡  as 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝 ~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2) , and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓 ~𝑁𝑁�𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2� , where 𝜇𝜇  is the 
true website entertainment value and 𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2 and 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 are the 
bidding experience variances that measure the 
precision of signals. Note that user 𝑖𝑖  receives the 
experience signals only when she bids in an auction. 
Assume user 𝑖𝑖  participates in a total of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  paid 
auctions and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 free auctions on day 𝑡𝑡. The aggregated 
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respectively. Consequently, the bidders update their 
posterior entertainment belief according to Bayes’ 
theorem (DeGroot, 1970) following the normal 
distribution, 𝑁𝑁�𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖






















.  Here, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  and 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1
2  are the 
mean and variance of the entertainment belief at the 
beginning of day 𝑡𝑡, which are the same as the posterior 
beliefs at the end of day 𝑡𝑡 − 1. Accordingly, bidders 
place a relatively higher weight on more precise 
signals (the signals with a lower variance).  
4.4 User Learning About Auction Closing 
Prices 
Because each new bid will raise the auction price by 
a positive price increment, a higher auction closing 
price directly reflects a higher level of auction 
competition. Consumers can observe the historical 
auction closing prices and use them to form 
expectations about future auction outcomes.  
We assume that users have prior beliefs about the 
closing price distribution for a specific auction 
category 𝑗𝑗  when they join the website. Thus, 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗0~𝑁𝑁�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0,𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃0
2 � , where 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0  and 𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃0
2  are the prior 
mean and variance of the closing price distribution, 
respectively. Users update their beliefs about type 
𝑗𝑗  auction closing prices on a daily basis. Thus, 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁 �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ,𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2 �, where 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 reflects the true auction 
competition and 𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2  is the closing price variance 
for type 𝑗𝑗 auctions.  
The users update their posterior closing price belief 
based on the daily closing price signals they observe 
following the normal distribution 𝑁𝑁 �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖















                                                     
through their own interactions and experiences on the 
website.  
Here, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1  and 𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1
2  are the mean and variance of 
the prior closing price belief for type 𝑗𝑗 auctions at the 
beginning of day 𝑡𝑡, which are the same as the posterior 
belief at the end of day 𝑡𝑡 − 1. 
4.5 Expected Utility and Likelihood 
Users make participation decisions based on their 
expected utilities. Denote 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  as user 𝑖𝑖 ’s information 
set, which contains all auction-related signals received 
up to day 𝑡𝑡. Conditional on the information set, and 
based on Equation (1), the expected utility of user 𝑖𝑖 
from participating in type 𝑗𝑗 auctions at time 𝑡𝑡 is:  
 𝐸𝐸�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑈𝑈�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, (2) 
where  
 𝑈𝑈�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸[𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 |𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] +
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 |𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔′ 𝐸𝐸[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]. (3) 
Expanding the conditional expected utility in Equation 
(3) and substituting into Equation (2) we have 
Equation (4). Detailed derivation of the expression is 
provided in Appendix E.  
𝐸𝐸�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 +
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸�(𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1)2�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2 + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔1𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔2𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔3𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 .   (4) 
Note that two sources of expected variability are 
associated with the observed type 𝑗𝑗 closing prices at 
the beginning of day 𝑡𝑡 . One source is the observed 
variance, 𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2 , of historical closing prices, and the other 
is 𝐸𝐸�(𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1)2�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� , which is the difference 
between the true closing price and the expected closing 
price of category 𝑗𝑗. If a user has little information about 
the true closing price, her estimation of auction 
competition would be inaccurate, which amplifies the 
risk involved in her decision-making. 
As previously mentioned, users might participate in a 
specific type of auction based on their expected 
utility. Let 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 denote user 𝑖𝑖’s participation variable, 
which is equal to 1 if user 𝑖𝑖  participates in type 𝑗𝑗 
auctions at time 𝑡𝑡  and is 0 otherwise. The 
participation decision of users for each type of 
auction is assumed to be independent. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is assumed 
to follow a Type I extreme value distribution. The 
probability of observing the user’s participation 











The joint likelihood that the sample users participate in 
the full bidding series can be expressed as: 






where 𝐴𝐴  is the participation decision matrix for the 
bidding action of all 𝑁𝑁  users for 𝐽𝐽  types of auctions 
over the entire observation period 𝑇𝑇. 
5 Model Estimation 
5.1 Simulated Maximum Likelihood 
The likelihood function in Equation (6) is jointly 
determined by the perceived entertainment effect and 
the anticipated auction closing prices, means and 
variances, and user- and time-specific covariates in 
each period. Note that the closing price signals can 
be observed, whereas the entertainment signals 
through bidding cannot. Because the high 
dimensional integration for the likelihood function 
is not feasible in closed form, we adopt a simulated 
maximum likelihood method (McFadden, 1989) to 
compute the likelihood function.7 
5.2 Identifications 
The nonmonetary payoff in the expected utility 
function consists of two terms. The first term, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1, is 
the overall entertainment belief of user 𝑖𝑖  at the 
beginning of day 𝑡𝑡 . The other term is the auction 
category-specific parameter, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, which represents the 
perceived average cognitive cost for users participating 
in different types of auction on the website. 𝛽𝛽2 was set 
as -5 for model identification purposes.8 
The prior belief about the website entertainment value, 
𝐸𝐸0, is the same for all users in our sample since they 
registered on the same date. Because the entertainment 
beliefs of active participating users are updated after 
they participate in more auctions and the entertainment 
beliefs of those who had no actions on the registration 
day stay unchanged, 𝐸𝐸0 can be identified through the 
observations before the first participation. 
The true website entertainment mean value 𝜇𝜇  was 
identified according to the steady state of users’ 
participation behavior. When users learn based on their 
own repeated participation, their entertainment beliefs, 
                                                     
7 During each round of optimization, we drew 100 simulated 
daily entertainment signals for each participating user in each 
type of auction. The value 100 was considered appropriate 
because the results were consistent after we increased the 
number of simulated signals to a larger value. The average 
likelihood for the 100 simulations was used as the numerical 
likelihood value for a specific iteration. 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , converge to their true mean. If the learning period 
is long enough, users learn the true value after a 
sufficient number of participations in the auctions. 
The experience signal variances for paid auctions (𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2) 
and free auctions (𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 ) were identified through the 
users’ participation patterns in the sample. For users 
who participated in one or more auctions during a day, 
the change in their probability of participation before 
and after the day helps infer the learning rate and 
identify the signal variance parameters, 𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2 and 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2. A 
smaller signal variance implies that users can obtain a 
more precise signal by participating in auctions. Thus, 
the knowledge acquisition of users about the website 
entertainment effect converges to the true value at a 
relatively faster learning rate.  
The prior belief about the auction closing prices, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0, 
can be identified using the frequency of participation 
in different types of auctions during the first day of 
registration. Each observed auction closing price was 
considered to be a realization of a random variable 
following a normal distribution with true mean 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 and 
variance 𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2 . Because the auction closing prices are 
observable, the population mean and variance are 
directly estimated from the complete data set. 
The variations in users’ participation in different types 
of auctions help to identify the coefficient 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 . 
Parameter 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔  reflects the average risk preference of 
users. Given that 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔  is negative, the users are risk-
seeking if 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔  is negative and are risk-averse if 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔  is 
positive. Users face uncertainty in the auction 
competition. They update their expected auction 
closing price dynamically, thereby affecting the 
likelihood of their participation in different types of 
auctions. Accordingly, the risk preference of users can 
be identified through this learning process. Finally, the 
sensitivity parameter vector, 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔 , of bidders can be 
identified using the changes in users’ dynamic 
participation behavior when the covariates change. 
6 Empirical Results 
6.1 Model Fit and Model Selection 
Incorporating learning effects into the model results in 
the need to estimate more parameters. We compare the 
performance of the full model defined in Section 5 with 
8 The base value of cognitive cost is usually set at unit value 
1 for identification purposes (Erdem et al., 2008; Narayanan 
& Manchanda, 2009; Ghose & Han, 2014). Nonetheless, 
certain studies have used other values as the base value. For 
example, Huang et al. (2014) fixed the base value at -6 for 
identification purposes. We set the base value at -5 in the 
main model estimation. Robustness checks for other base 
values are shown in Section 6.3. 




three alternative models to test how learning 
improves the model fit. Model 1 does not consider 
the learning effects at all. In this case, we assume 
users know the true entertainment value, as well as 
the true mean auction closing prices, for different 
types of auctions. Model 2 assume the users are 
certain about the website entertainment effect and 
includes only the auction closing price learning 
component. Model 3 assumes that users are 
uncertain about the auction closing prices and 
incorporates only the entertainment learning effect.  
Table 3 reports the log likelihood, the Akaike 
information criteria (AIC), and the Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC) values, as well as the log 
likelihood for out-of-sample tests for each model. The 
model with the lower AIC and BIC values is preferred. 
Table 3. Model Fit and Comparison 
Model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full model 
No learning Price learning 
Entertainment 
learning Both price and entertainment learnings 
Latent classes One One One One Two Three 
In-sample (241 users registered on the same day) 
Log likelihood -2902.05 -2083.13 -1964.66 -1789.85 -1741.73 -1717.59 
# of Parameters 8 11 11 14 20 26 
Sample size 65793 65793 65793 65793 65793 65793 
AIC 5064.85 4188.27 3951.31 3607.69 3523.46 3487.18 
BIC 5136.85 4288.30 4051.35 3735.01 3705.34 3723.63 
Out-of-sample (325 users registered on a different day) 
Log likelihood -3239.72 -2396.93 -2421.04 -2026.63 -2013.19 -2022.69 
Comparing Model 1 (the model without learning) with 
Model 2 and Model 3 (models that have only one 
learning component), we see that the two types of 
learning independently contribute to improving the 
model fit. It suggests that the two learning mechanisms 
are substitutable to each other. Moreover, 
entertainment learning has a larger effect on improving 
the model fit than the auction closing prices learning.  
The log likelihood, AIC and BIC values suggest that the 
full model performs the best among the alternative models. 
It indicates that these two types of learning mechanisms 
complement each other. Both the learning of the 
entertainment value and the learning of auction closing 
prices are important to explain the observed data variations.  
In addition, the full model allows for user 
heterogeneity in terms of auction competition (𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 ), 
risk preference (𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔), monetary payoffs, and loss status 
(𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔 ). We estimate the number of latent segments 𝑔𝑔 
using 1, 2, and 3 latent segments, respectively. As 
shown in Table 3, if we increase 𝑔𝑔 from 1 to 2, AIC 
and BIC, as well as the log likelihood values, for in-
sample and out-of-sample tests all are improved. 
Meanwhile, if we increase the 𝑔𝑔 value from 2 to 3, the 
BIC and log likelihood for the out-of-sample test 
deteriorate, but the AIC and log likelihood for the in-
sample test slightly improve. Hence, we select two 
latent segments for further parameter estimates. 
6.2 Parameter Estimation 
Table 4 summarizes the parameter estimation results. 
Let us first look at the homogenous parameter 
estimates. Since we fixed 𝛽𝛽2  at -5 in our model 
estimation, 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽3  are estimated with negative 
values, reflecting the average cognitive cost for users 
participating in the other two types of paid auctions. 
The absolute values for Type 1 auctions (virtual 
products, 4.900) and Type 2 auctions (general 
merchandise, fixed at 5) are smaller than the absolute 
values for Type 3 auctions (digital products, 6.340).
 




Table 4. Structural Model Parameter Estimation 
Heterogeneous parameters 
Segment 1 Segment 2 
Estimates Std. error Estimates Std. error 
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 Sensitivity to auction competition -2.824 0.000*** -4.159 0.348*** 
𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 Risk preference 3.223 0.000*** -0.071 0.002*** 
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔1 Past monetary gain 4.124 0.000*** -0.435 0.053*** 
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔2 Cumulative monetary gain -5.239 0.000*** 0.487 0.066*** 
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔3 Consecutive bidding loss 0.117 0.000*** 0.990 0.344**    
𝜋𝜋𝑔𝑔 Segment membership probability 0.413 0.036*** 0.587 -- 
Homogenous parameters Estimates Std. error 
𝛽𝛽1 Type 1 (virtual products) cognitive cost -4.900 0.157*** 
𝛽𝛽2 Type 2 (general merchandise) cognitive cost -5 -Fixed 
𝛽𝛽3 Type 3 (digital products) cognitive cost -6.340 0.622*** 
𝜇𝜇 Mean website entertainment value 6.017 0.573*** 
𝐸𝐸0 Prior belief about website entertainment value 7.297 0.512*** 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸0
2  Variance of prior belief about website entertainment value 10 -Fixed 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2 Log variance of paid auction participation signal 4.281 0.271*** 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 Log variance of free auction participation signal 2.086 0.254*** 
𝑃𝑃10 Prior belief for Type 1 auction closing price 1.737 0.107*** 
𝑃𝑃20 Prior belief for Type 2 auction closing price 1.752 0.113*** 
𝑃𝑃30 Prior belief for Type 3 auction closing price 5.310 0.373*** 
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃0
2  Variance of prior belief about auction closing price 10 -Fixed 
𝑃𝑃1 Mean closing price for Type 1 auction 2.346 0.070*** 
𝑃𝑃2 Mean closing price for Type 2 auction 2.195 0.061*** 
𝑃𝑃3 Mean closing price for Type 3 auction 8.441 0.556*** 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁1
2  Log variance of Type 1 auction closing price signal  -0.799 0.147*** 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁2
2  Log variance of Type 2 auction closing price signal -1.064 0.147*** 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁3
2  Log variance of Type 3 auction closing price signal 3.371 0.147*** 
Note: *** denotes significant at 0.001; ** denotes significant at 0.01. 




This finding is considered reasonable because the 
average duration for Type 1 and Type 2 auctions is 
relatively short, and auctions usually end quickly, 
lasting from a few minutes to a few hours. In contrast, 
Type 3 products generally have higher retail prices, 
and users who participate in this type of auction might 
persist for a long time. For example, the auctions for 
popular Apple product auctions can last for more than 
one day, pausing at 00:00 a.m. and restarting at 9:00 
a.m. The time and cognitive costs associated with this 
type of auction are higher than those related to the 
other types of auctions. 
The website entertainment value measures the average 
overall effect of the entertainment auction environment 
on the utility of users—for example, the average level 
of enjoyment provided by the online auction games 
and the overall quality of services on the website. The 
prior entertainment belief, 𝐸𝐸0 (7.297), is significantly 
higher than the estimated true mean entertainment 
value 𝜇𝜇  (6.017). This result indicates that users 
overestimate the entertainment benefit they can obtain 
when they initially join the website. Recall that users 
participate in both paid and free auctions. The 
estimated natural logarithm variance for free auctions 
(2.086) is smaller than that for paid auctions (4.281). 
Thus, the signal from free auctions is more precise. 
This is mainly because users do not have a monetary 
sunk cost for free auctions, which enables them to 
obtain a more accurate entertainment valuation by 
participating in the free auctions. 
The estimated initial auction type-specific closing 
price beliefs are 1.737, 1.752, and 5.310, which are 
smaller than the true means of 2.346, 2.195, and 8.441, 
respectively. This result indicates that users 
underestimate the auction closing prices for all three 
types of auction. The overestimation of the 
entertainment value and underestimation of auction 
competition together confirm the observation that 
many users actively participate in auctions when they 
initially register on the website, but their level of 
participation decreases over time. In terms of signal 
precision, Type 1 and Type 2 auctions show more 
precise signals than Type 3 auctions. The natural 
logarithm of variances are -0.799, -1.064, and 3.371, 
respectively, for the three types of auction. These 
figures suggest that learning in the digital products 
category is more difficult to achieve than learning in 
the first two types of auction. 
Next, we turn to heterogeneous model parameter 
estimates. Because parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔  for the expected 
auction closing price is estimated as -2.824 for the first 
latent segment and -4.159 for the second latent 
segment, it appears that users in Segment 2 are more 
sensitive about auction competition than users in 
Segment 1. The risk preference parameters, 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 , are 
positive for users in Segment 1 (3.223) and negative 
for users in Segment 2 (-0.071). Together with the 
negative estimation of 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 , the result indicates that 
users in Segment 1 show risk-averse preferences, while 
users in Segment 2 show risk-seeking preferences. 
Hence, a relatively large percentage (58.9%) of the 
users in our data exhibits risk-seeking behavior and the 
rest is risk-averse.  
The parameter for the recent past monetary gain, 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔1, 
is positive for users in Segment 1 (4.124) and negative 
(-0.435) for users in Segment 2. Because users in 
Segment 1 are risk-averse, a gain in the recent past 
increases their participation interest in the following 
period, while a loss in the recent past reduces their 
participation interest in the following period. Because 
Segment 2 users are risk-seeking, the loss increases 
their participation interest in the following period. 
In contrast, the cumulative balance, 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔2 , negatively 
affects the utility for Segment 1 users (-5.239) and 
positively affects the utility for Segment 2 users 
(0.487). When a risk-averse user loses a significant 
amount of money cumulatively on the entertainment 
auction website, that user’s utility is negatively 
affected. Such users might quit the website without 
bidding anymore. The opposite is true for the risk-
seeking users, whose utility is positively affected. The 
risk-seeking users might become addicted and stay on 
the website, continuing to participate in auctions even 
though they have incurred significant losses in the past.  
Finally, the coefficients for the consecutive loss 
indicator, 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔3 , are positive for both segments (0.117 
and 0.990, respectively). The positive coefficient 
indicates that users become more addicted to the game 
after losing many auctions. The higher coefficient of 
Segment 2 users also suggests that they might be more 
likely to overly commit to the auction games than 
Segment 1 users. This result reflects the gambling 
effect inherent in the pay-to-bid auction mechanism 
and the entertainment shopping environment, and the 
finding is consistent with the prior literature on the 
escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976; Malmendier & 
Lee, 2011; McGee, 2013) that has been widely 
discussed in the context of lotteries and gambling. 
6.3 Robustness Checks 
The results obtained in this study are robust and not 
sensitive to particular assumptions underlying the data 
analysis. Table 5 demonstrates the robustness of the 
model by using different data sets and by varying some 
criteria in the model estimation.  
In the main model, a sample of users who registered on 
the same day was used to represent the population of 
users. This approach effectively controlled the 
confounding effects of consumer learning. An 
alternative sample was then selected to estimate the 
model and test its robustness.  




Table 5. Parameter Estimation and Robustness Checks 
 Sample (325 Users) Base value (𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐= -1) No. of losses (18) 
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 1 Segment 2 
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 -4.034*** (0.000)  -7.088*** (0.178)  -1.723*** (0.000)  -3.882*** (0.439)  -3.649*** (0.000)  -4.084*** (0.550)  
𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 7.055*** (0.000)  -0.072*** (0.001)  0.490*** (0.000)  -0.070*** (0.002)  2.398*** (0.000)  -0.071*** (0.002)  
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔1 0.036*** (0.000)  -0.330*** (0.051)  2.549*** (0.000)  -0.443*** (0.052)  2.148*** (0.000)  -0.445*** (0.051)  
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔2 -1.838*** (0.000)  0.531*** (0.065)  -3.797*** (0.000)  0.615*** (0.082)  -7.523*** (0.000)  0.513*** (0.066)  
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔3 1.235*** (0.000)  2.020*** (0.352)  0.561*** (0.000)  1.130*** (0.408)  0.453*** (0.000)    0.154        (0.507) 
𝜋𝜋𝑔𝑔 0.347*** (0.030)   0.653        (--) 0.464*** (0.003)    0.536       (--)   0.414       (--) 0.586*** (0.036)  
𝛽𝛽1 -4.857(0.168) *** -0.871(0.159) *** -4.900(0.163) *** 
𝛽𝛽2 -5(-Fixed) -1(-Fixed) -5(-Fixed) 
𝛽𝛽3 -6.991(0.792) *** -2.092(0.621) *** -6.373(0.645) *** 
𝜇𝜇 9.186(0.369) *** 2.263(0.741) ** 5.823(0.933) *** 
𝐸𝐸0 10.974(0.176) *** 3.091(0.634) *** 7.187(0.792) *** 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸0
2  10(-Fixed) 10(-Fixed) 10(-Fixed) 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2 3.716(0.203) *** 3.247(0.241) *** 4.317(0.270) *** 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 3.466(0.319) *** 2.695(0.250) *** 2.313(0.273) *** 
𝑃𝑃10 2.038(0.049) *** 1.693(0.128) *** 1.722(0.136) *** 
𝑃𝑃20 1.976(0.049) *** 1.703(0.138) *** 1.738(0.149) *** 
𝑃𝑃30 6.164(0.313) *** 5.209(0.414) *** 5.242(0.550) *** 
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃0
2  10(-Fixed) 10(-Fixed) 10(-Fixed) 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations for estimates. 
*** denotes significant at 0.001; ** denotes significant at 0.01; * denotes significant at 0.05. 
The mean and variance for three closing price distributions are the same as in Table 4. 
The new sample was a group of 325 users who 
registered on a different day and who were 
observed long enough for their learning process to 
become stable. The estimation results are presented 
in the first column in Table 5. We observe the same 
signs and similar numerical values as the main 
model. The qualitative insights are robust against 
the different samples of users.  
In the previous model estimation, 𝛽𝛽2, which represents 
the average cognitive cost users incur from a Type 2 
product auction on the website, was set at -5 for model 
identification purpose. We use 𝛽𝛽2 = −1  here for 
robustness check. The estimation results are presented 
in the second column in Table 5. All estimated 
parameters have the same sign as those reported in 
Table 4. Since the base value for identification is 
changed, the estimated numerical values also vary. 
However, the new values present similar relative 
relationships in magnitude. Hence, the estimation 
results are robust against the choice of base values.  
In the base model, we use a loss indicator 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  to 
indicate whether the user has consecutively lost a fixed 
number of auctions. We have chosen 15 consecutive 
auction losses as the threshold value. In the robustness 
test, we change the threshold value to 18. As seen from 
the third column in Table 5, the parameter estimates 




are all significant and are not significantly affected 
when the cumulative loss threshold value is changed.  
6.4 Alternative Explanation 
In the main model, we find there is an overestimation 
of the entertainment value in initial participation. As 
consumers gain more experiences, their entertainment 
belief converges to a lower value. We wonder whether 
we could alternatively interpret the “overestimation” 
effect as a natural decline of the perceived 
entertainment value due to tenure and participation 
experience.9 We address this concern in this section. 
Instead of using the Bayesian framework for 
entertainment belief updating in the main model, we 
assume a user’s perceived entertainment value is 
affected by her tenure and participation experience. 
The first model specifies that 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 = 𝐸𝐸0 + 𝑎𝑎 ∗
𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿_𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒 ∗
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (Model A), where the constant is 
the perceived entertainment value at the beginning of 
the registration day. The second model specification 
takes the log transformation of tenure, so that 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 =
𝐸𝐸0 + 𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔 (𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿_𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (Model B). The third model 
assumes the perceived entertainment value takes an 
exponential decay functional form, converging to the 
true mean at the end of the observation period. The 
entertainment belief equation becomes  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 = 𝜇𝜇 +
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿_𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒 ∗
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) (Model C). Keeping all the other 
variables the same as in the main model, Table 6 
presents the estimated parameters in the entertainment 
belief equations from the three model specifications. 
For the purpose of comparison, we also present the full 
model parameter estimates in the fourth column. 
Table 6. Effects of Tenure and Participation Experience on Entertainment Value 
Parameters Model A Model B Model C Full model 
𝐸𝐸0 2.432 (0.166) *** 3.363 (0.179) *** / 7.297 (0.512) *** 
𝑎𝑎 -0.067 (0.005) *** -1.339 (0.104) *** -1.071 (0.763)      / 
𝑏𝑏 0.093 (0.006) *** 0.092 (0.005) *** -0.002 (0.196)      / 
𝑒𝑒 0.012 (0.028)      0.011 (0.020)      0.883 (0.160) *** / 
𝜇𝜇 / / 5.070 (0.580) *** 6.017 (0.573) *** 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2 / / / 4.281 (0.271) *** 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 / / / 2.086 (0.254) *** 
Log likelihood -1802.27 -1785.58 -1835.20 -1741.73 
AIC 3644.54 3611.16 3710.40 3523.46 
BIC 3826.43 3793.05 3892.29 3705.34 
Plots for mean 
entertainment 
beliefs 
    
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significant at 0.001; * denotes significant at 0.05. 
                                                     
9 We thank the anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
































































































In Model A and Model B, the negative coefficients for 
tenure indicate that users perceive high entertainment 
value at the beginning, and that the perceived 
entertainment value declines over time. However, this 
natural decline explanation suggests the users’ 
experienced entertainment values would keep 
decreasing. If the user stayed on the website long 
enough, their entertainment value would decrease to 
zero or even negative values (see the plots in the first 
two columns), which is not reasonable. In addition, the 
estimated coefficient c for free auction participation is 
insignificant, indicating that participating in free 
auctions has no significant impact on perceived 
entertainment value. This is inconsistent with our data. 
As shown in Figure C1 in the Appendix, the free top-up 
cards auctions generated the lowest revenue over retail 
value (measured at 0.51CNY) among all the auction 
categories. The website loses money by offering these 
auctions as an effort to increase the website’s 
entertainment value to attract and retain users. 
Model C produces a quick decline of entertainment 
belief, which stabilizes at value 5.07. In comparison, 
our full model shows that users overestimate the 
entertainment value (7.297) at the beginning and the 
entertainment belief converges to the true value of 
6.017. Compared with Model A and Model B, 
although Model C produces entertainment belief 
curves closer to our own, the log likelihood, AIC, and 
BIC values indicate Model C has the poorest data fit.  
Clearly, our model outperforms these alternative 
models. We believe the main reason is that our model 
can account for heterogeneity of user behaviors while 
Models A-C fail to do so. By assuming different latent 
classes, our model takes heterogeneity in user learning 
into account in the following ways. First, our model 
allows users to have heterogeneous beliefs. Second, 
since entertainment values are unobservable, we 
randomly generated the paid and free entertainment 
signals from a normal distribution based on each user’s 
daily participation experience. Both the values of 
signals and the frequency of the user’s participation per 
day were taken into consideration in the entertainment 
belief updating. The signal generation process and the 
Bayesian belief update framework take a wide range of 
user experiences and behavioral patterns into account. 
In summary, a learning model based on Bayesian 
belief updating provides more explanatory power than 
models using some independent variables to directly 
reflect the change of entertainment belief. Similar to 
Ghose & Han (2014) who assume there is a true 
“content match value” on the mobile Internet, we 
assume there is a true entertainment value on the 
entertainment shopping website. Learning models 
have been frequently used in new products and in  
introductions to services. Thus, learning naturally 
occurs when new users first register on the website. As 
the users interact more with the website, the learning 
process reveals the true website entertainment value 
and converges with its underlying true measure. 
6.5 Moderating Effects of Observable 
Characteristics on Learning 
We further examine heterogeneity of learning to 
identify whether users’ observable characteristics 
moderate their learning effectiveness. We characterize 
users with two indicators: 𝐼𝐼_𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 =1 for users who 
have winning experience and 𝐼𝐼_𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =1 for users 
who are classified into the persistent group (we use the 
cutoff value of 5 auctions, since 20% of users in the 
sample participate in more than five auctions).  
In the main model, we assume that all users have the 
same level of precision (the same variance from a 
normal distribution) in generating their entertainment 
signals and auction closing price signals, respectively. 
Taking into account the learning heterogeneity, we 
modify the variances for entertainment signals and 
closing price signals as 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑜𝑜 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 ∗
𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , and 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 + 𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 . For 
the indicator variable, we use 𝐼𝐼_𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 in Model D and 
𝐼𝐼_𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 in Model E. 
Table 7 presents the empirical results. Both 𝐼𝐼_𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 and 
𝐼𝐼_𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  have shown a positive moderation effect 
(𝑜𝑜=1.548 in Model D and 𝑜𝑜=2.717 in Model E) on 
entertainment signal variance. It suggests that learning 
of the true entertainment value from users who have 
winning experience is less effective than learning from 
those who do not have winning experience.  
Table 7. Moderating Effects of Observable Characteristics on Learning Mechanism 
Parameters Model D Model E 
𝑜𝑜 1.548 (0.281) *** 2.717 (0.724) *** 
𝐿𝐿 0.008 (0.043) 0.087 (0.037) * 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** denotes significant at 0.001; * denotes significant at 0.05. 




One possible explanation is the joy of winning. 
Bidders who have previously won auction games 
obtained higher entertainment signals and 
perceived higher entertainment value than those 
who had no winning experience. Inaccurate signals 
with larger variance tend to delay users’ discovery 
of the true entertainment value.  
In comparison, the moderating effect of both past 
winning and persistent participation on the price 
learning mechanism is not as significant as 
entertainment learning. The positive effect is either 
nonsignificant (𝐿𝐿=0.008, p-value=0.043) or only 
marginally significant at the 0.05 level (𝐿𝐿=0.087, 
p-value=0.037). 
7 Policy Simulations 
Our empirical model analysis helps us gain a better 
understanding of users’ participation behaviors on 
entertainment auction websites. Since structural 
models allow for counterfactual analyses, we perform 
a set of policy experiments in this section. Our 
objective is to recommend some plausible policy 
changes to help the website designer address the 
consumer churn problem, which is a pain point in the 
current entertainment shopping industry. 
Because the number of daily active users reflects the 
operating performance of web-based shopping 
platforms (Astonkar & Buchade, 2015), we use the 
percentage of active users per day as our performance 
measure. For each policy design, we simulate 2,000 
iterations with estimated parameters and use the 
average performance measure to assess the effects of 
the policy changes. Based on three key learning model 
components, Table 8 summarizes our policy questions 
and the corresponding policy simulation designs.  
 
Table 8. Policy Simulations Design 
Model components Policy questions Simulation designs 
Paid auction learning Should the website disclose historical auction 
closing prices? 
Increase the auction closing price signal 
variance, 𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2 , by 20% and 50%.  
Free auction learning Should the website offer new users free auction 
bids? 
Remove all free auctions by setting 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  for all 
users at zero.  
Auction competition 
learning 
Should the website limit the auction 
competition? 
Reduce the true mean closing prices, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗, by 20% 
and 50%.  
7.1 Should the Website Disclose 
Historical Auction Closing Prices? 
Because users update their perceptions about auction 
competition based on  observed auction closing price 
signals, the website can strategically influence users’ 
observational learning. Because less information leads 
to higher uncertainty, the website can increase the 
auction closing price variances in a specific product 
category by disclosing partial historical auction 
information instead of full historical auction data.  
To examine the effect of auction closing price signals 
on consumer learning, we increase the auction closing 
price signal variances by 20% and 50%, respectively. 
Figure 4 shows that these changes did not yield 
discernable effects on virtual product (Type 1) or 
general merchandise (Type 2) auctions. However, the 
percentage of daily active users for digital products 
(Type 3) auctions significantly increased. Two 
plausible reasons explain this observation. First, large 
closing price variances make consumer observational 
learning less effective, leading to continued 
underestimation of auction competition, because higher 
expected auction payoff attracts consumers. Second, 
higher uncertainty in auction competition stimulates 
risk-seeking consumers’ persistent interest in 
participation. Both factors potentially contribute to the 
increased number of daily active users on the website. 
A key feature of the entertainment shopping website 
design is the uncertainty involved in the auction 
outcomes. By strategically disclosing less historical 
information, the website purposely makes 
observational learning less effective. As such, the 
website would benefit from this policy change. This 
finding is supported by current industry practice. For 
example, Quibids.com has already adopted this 
strategy. It displays only the nine most recent 
completed auctions for each auctioned product. 
 
 





Figure 4. Percentages of Active Users After Varying Auction Closing Price Signals 
7.2 Should the Website Offer New Users 
Free Auction Bids? 
Our base model estimation shows that free auctions 
provide a more precise signal than paid auctions and 
that new users overestimate the entertainment value of 
the website at the beginning of their participation. 
Therefore, offering new users free auction bids enables 
them to participate in more free auctions, helping them 
to quickly discover the true entertainment value. The 
free auction bids thus might have the adverse effect of 
inducing some users to quit using the website early on 
rather than engaging them.  
In this policy experiment, we eliminate all free 
auctions and set parameter 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for all users during the 
observation period at zero. Figure 5 shows that 
removing free auctions helps increase the expected 
percentage of active users on the website, even though 
the effect is not significant. 
 
Figure 5. Percentages of Active Users without Free Auctions 
Although providing free auction bids at the time of 
registration helps attract new users, it has the 
negative effect of allowing consumers who have 
quickly learned the true entertainment values to 
quit after a few trials on the free auctions. If the 
website aims to engage users, it should provide free 
auctions to users who have stayed on the website 
for a relatively long time. These users, if they are 
still active after having participated in many 
auctions, have already learned the true 
entertainment value. Free auction bids can be 
offered to these persistent users to better engage 
them in the entertainment auction environment. For 
example, it would be an effective strategy to award 
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free auction bids to winners who upload pictures of 
their winning products or who frequently share 
their winning experiences.  
7.3 Should the Website Limit the Auction 
Competition? 
To create a fair auction environment and to avoid jump 
bidding (i.e., bidders enter an auction after others have 
placed a considerable number of bids), some websites 
have introduced locked auctions. For example, 
QuiBids.com has imposed a time limit: After a certain 
point, auctions become locked, and only bidders who 
have been participating are able to continue placing 
bids, while all other bidders are “locked out.” 
Compared with the free entry rule, setting a time limit 
helps restrict the total number of participants in an 
auction after the auction has already been running for 
some time, thereby protecting the bidders who have 
already sunk bidding fees into the early stages of the 
game. This policy has the potential effect of reducing 
auction closing prices, since our data shows that 
auction closing price is positively correlated with the 
total number of bidders in an auction (see Table D2 in 
Appendix D). Consequently, it directly affects the 
expected revenue of the auction.  
Because average auction competition is reflected by 
mean closing prices, this policy simulation limits 
average auction competition through controlling 
closing prices. We reduce the true mean values of 
auction closing price for each type of auction, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗, by 
20% and 50% but keep other parameters the same as 
the estimated values. Figure 6 presents the percentage 
of active users under different policies.  
 
Figure 6. Percentage of Active Users After Reducing Auction Closing Prices 
The results indicate that the virtual product category has 
the highest percentage increase in active users, whereas 
the digital product category has the lowest percentage 
increase. This observation suggests that introducing 
policies such as “locked auction” to limit auction 
competition is more effective in the virtual product 
category than in other categories. Although controlling 
the auction competition in the highly demanded digital 
product category is helpful, it does not help retain users as 
much as it does in the other product categories. 
8 Discussion and Conclusion 
The unique selling mechanism of pay-to-bid auctions 
has attracted both consumers and businesses, resulting 
in the proliferation of numerous entertainment 
shopping websites worldwide in recent years. Despite 
their huge revenue potential, many of these websites 
have ceased operations after only a short period of 
time, throwing doubts on the entertainment shopping 
concept and the sustainability of the business model. 
This study proposes a dynamic structural model of 
consumer learning to understand consumer 
participation and churn behaviors in different 
categories of product auctions. We also conducted 
policy simulations to evaluate the potential effects of 
policy changes on consumer participation to address 
the observed consumer churn issues.  
Our model captures consumer learning on the basis of 
both the consumers’ own participation experience and 
observational learning on the website. Both types of 
learning are important in influencing the participation 
behavior of consumers. In particular, new consumers 
tend to significantly overestimate the entertainment 
value but underestimate the level of competition 
during the beginning stages of their participation. This 
finding helps explain the overall decreasing 
participation and increasing churn rate observed over 
time. Moreover, our model estimation segments 
consumers into two groups based on their participation 
behavior: one group of risk-averse users quits the 

































Closing price reduced by 20%
Closing price reduced by 50%

























Closing price reduced by 20%
Closing price reduced by 50%



























Closing price reduced by 20%
Closing price reduced by 50%




website quickly, even before they learn its true 
entertainment value; the other group of risk-seeking 
users can fully discover the entertainment benefit, is 
likely to be addicted to the auction games, and persists 
on the website for a longer period of time.  
Our empirical findings offer several website design 
implications for consumer churn management. Since 
the cognitive cost negatively impacts consumer utility, 
we suggest automatic bidding tools to reduce 
consumers’ cognitive costs of participation. The 
website can also provide more auctions in the virtual 
product category because this category incurs the 
lowest nonmonetary participation cost. Since the 
entertainment value positively affects consumer utility, 
we suggest more game design features to increase the 
potential entertainment value on the website. All these 
efforts undoubtedly enhance user experience.  
Our policy simulation further shows the effectiveness 
of disclosing less historical information on customer 
retention. This is achieved by weakening the effect of 
consumers’ observational learning. In addition, we 
find that offering free auction bids to new users has an 
adverse effect on their participation. More 
participation in free auctions would allow new users to 
more quickly learn of the entertainment value and may 
induce them to quit early. Instead, the website should 
offer free auction bids to users who have been active 
for a while to better engage them in the entertainment 
shopping environment. Finally, we find that locked 
auctions are actually beneficial in retaining active 
users, especially in the virtual product category.  
The insights gained in this research could be 
generalized to other similar selling mechanisms that 
combine the elements of auction and lottery. For 
example, Raviv and Virag (2009) analyzed a different 
selling mechanism in which the auction charges each 
bidder an entry fee, the bidders submit sealed bids, and 
the winning bid is the highest unique bid among all 
bids received. More generally, the method of modeling 
consumers’ risk attitude together with consumer 
learning based on both latent and observable variables 
is relevant in other consumer decision-making 
contexts, such as crowdsourcing contests. Not only 
does our model provide insights relevant to industries 
experiencing frequent consumer churns, but it is also 
relevant to other industries involving information 
disclosure and firms that strategically interact with 
consumers. For example, film studios sometimes 
purposely withhold movies from critics before their 
release because moviegoers often overestimate the 
quality of unreviewed movies. Firms may examine 
what level of information disclosure is optimal to 
profitably exploit consumer bias.  
The current model has several limitations. First, 
because the research focus is on consumers’ learning 
across different categories of product auctions, 
consumers’ in-game experience is not explicitly 
incorporated into the model. Although some recent 
research in penny auctions has attempted to model 
consumers’ bidding strategies in each stage of the 
auction bidding game (Byers et al., 2010; Platt et al., 
2013; Augenblick, 2016), these models use 
equilibrium types of analysis without capturing the 
behavior aspects of consumer decision-making. A 
possible future avenue would be to build a micro level 
behavior model to study consumers’ bidding strategies 
in unique entertainment auctions.  
Second, consumers are heterogeneous in nature and 
may have different educational backgrounds, income, 
and budget constraints, risk attitudes, and shopping 
interests. Because we do not have access to data that 
includes these consumer characteristics, our model 
cannot capture such heterogeneity. Thus, future 
research might use surveys and lab experiments to 
collect the behavior data of individual consumers. An 
enriched model would offer more valuable insights 
that are not available from this study.  
Finally, we consider the consumer’s participation 
decision as a myopic decision problem based on the 
consumer’s current information set, beliefs about the 
entertainment value, and perceptions about auction 
competition. Future research might build a dynamic 
optimization model to study consumers’ forward-
looking behavior in managing a portfolio of auction 
participation, subject to consumers’ personal total 
budget constraints, to improve their overall 
experiences on entertainment shopping websites.   
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Appendix A: Notation Table 
Table A1: Notation Table 
Notation Definition 
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔 Sensitivity to auction competition for 𝑔𝑔th latent segment 
𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗  Auction category-specific (or type-specific) cognitive cost 
 𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔 Users’ risk preference toward variation in closing price for 𝑔𝑔th latent segment 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 Error term 
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔 Vector of covariates contained in 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for 𝑔𝑔th latent segment 
𝜇𝜇 The true mean of website entertainment value  
𝜋𝜋𝑔𝑔 Segment membership probability for 𝑔𝑔th latent segment 
𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2 Variance of the experience signal for paid auctions 
𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2  Variance of the observed type  𝑗𝑗 auctions’ closing price signals  
𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 Variance of the experience signal for free auctions 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸02  Variance of users’ prior belief about the website entertainment value 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  User 𝑖𝑖’s posterior variance of the entertainment value at the end of day 𝑡𝑡 
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃0
2  Variance of users’ prior belief about the auction closing price 
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
2  Users’ posterior variance of type 𝑗𝑗 auction closing price at the end of day 𝑡𝑡 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 User 𝑖𝑖’s participation decision for type 𝑗𝑗 auction on day 𝑡𝑡 
𝐴𝐴 Action matrix for 𝑁𝑁 users toward 𝐽𝐽 types of auctions over the period 𝑇𝑇 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖0 User 𝑖𝑖’s prior belief about the website entertainment value 
𝐸𝐸0 The mean of users’ prior belief about the website entertainment value 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  User 𝑖𝑖’s 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖ℎ paid auction experience signal on day 𝑡𝑡, following N(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2) 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓  User 𝑖𝑖’s 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖ℎ free auction experience signal on day 𝑡𝑡, following N(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2) 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  User 𝑖𝑖’s aggregated paid auction signals on day 𝑡𝑡, following N(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎𝛿𝛿2 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ ) 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓 User 𝑖𝑖’s aggregated free auction signals on day 𝑡𝑡, following N(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ ) 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 User 𝑖𝑖’s posterior mean of the entertainment value at the end of day 𝑡𝑡 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  Website entertainment value user 𝑖𝑖 perceives on day 𝑡𝑡 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Number of free auctions in which user 𝑖𝑖 participated on day 𝑡𝑡 
𝑔𝑔 Latent class membership 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 User 𝑖𝑖’s information set at the beginning of day 𝑡𝑡 




Table A1: Notation Table 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 A loss indicator for whether a user has lost a number of auctions consecutively 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  User 𝑖𝑖’s cumulative wealth up to day 𝑡𝑡 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙  User 𝑖𝑖’s earning during the previous day 𝑡𝑡 − 1 (at the beginning of day 𝑡𝑡) 
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Number of paid auctions in which user 𝑖𝑖 participated on day 𝑡𝑡 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗0 User 𝑖𝑖’s prior belief about category 𝑗𝑗 auction closing price 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0 The mean of users’ prior belief about type 𝑗𝑗 auction closing price 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 User 𝑖𝑖’s observed closing price signal for category 𝑗𝑗 auction on day 𝑡𝑡 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 Users’ posterior mean of type 𝑗𝑗 auction closing price at the end of day 𝑡𝑡 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 The true mean closing price of type 𝑗𝑗 auctions 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Vector of user- and time-specific covariates 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 User 𝑖𝑖’s utility from participating in a category 𝑗𝑗 auction on day 𝑡𝑡 
𝑈𝑈�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 User 𝑖𝑖’s expected utility from participating in a category 𝑗𝑗 auction on day 𝑡𝑡 
 
  




Appendix B: Screen Shots for Entertainment Auction Websites 
 
Figure B1. Screen Shot for 5Pai.com 






1) 9Pai.net is an entertainment auction site in China that employs a website design and selling mechanism that are very similar to those of 
5Pai.com. 
2) Quibids.com is the largest entertainment auction site in the United States. 
Figure B2. Screen Shots for 9Pai.net and Quibids.com 
  




Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
Table C1 summarizes the statistics in terms of the total number of auctions, total revenue, and total value of products 
sold on the website (which is based on the listed retail prices of the products).  
Table C1. Auctions and Auctioneer Revenue by Productsa 
Products No. of Auctions Total revenue (CNY) Total value (CNY) 
Bid packs 2,967 824,376  131,270  
Gift & top-up cards 5,344 450,691  190,549  
Fashion, health & beauty 1,710 382,859  401,349  
Hobbies & outdoors 1,050 141,235  168,666  
Home, garden & tools 1,641 304,959  347,314  
Kitchen & dining 1,226 288,117  272,216  
Computers & laptops 225 839,148  432,818  
Portable electronics 2,413 4,130,030  1,997,878  
Digital accessories 4,887 709,996  802,862  
Total 21,463 8,071,410  4,744,922  
a We used the retail prices listed on the website, which might not be the same as the real retail prices in other online or physical stores. 
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To measure the average profitability of the auctions under different product categories, we define the revenue over 
retail value in CNY as the ratio of the average revenue from the auctions to the average listed retail prices in a product 
category. Figure C1 shows the average profitability.  
We see that the most profitable auction category on the website is the bid pack category, the average revenue of which 
is 6.28 times its value. It is calculated as follows: A bid pack of 10 bids has a value of CNY10. On average, the auction 
collects bidding fees of CNY62.8, so the revenue over retail value in CNY for the bid pack is 6.28.  
The second most profitable product category is Apple products (the average revenue over retail value, in CNY, is 
3.22). The third most profitable product category is top-up cards of different face values (2.76). In contrast, the website 
loses money in categories with revenue over retail value (CNY) of less than 1. However, these auctions represent more 
than 58% of all the auctions conducted on the website. We believe that the website offers these nonprofitable auctions 
to attract and retain active users because a healthy number of active users is the most important determinant for the 
website’s sustainability. 




Appendix D: Additional Empirical Tests 
D1. Users’ Bidding Skills 
The regression results in Table D1 indicate that the number of participations and observed auctions by a user did not 
significantly affect the average profit per bid of the user. 
Table D1. Regression Tests for Users’ Bidding Skill 
Dependent variable: profit per bid 
Independent variables Coefficients 
# of participated auctions -0.0008(0.0003)    -0.0062(0.0030) * 
Log # of provided auctions  0.0003(0.0005)  0.0008(0.0008) 
Auction-type fixed effects Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects No Yes 
R-square 0.0164 0.1627 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significant at 0.05. 
D2. Auction Competition 
In the main model, the auction closing price is used as a proxy for auction competition. Using the 17,930 paid auction 
observations, the regression results show that the number of participants in the auction has a significant positive effect 
on the auction closing price. 
Table D2. Regression Tests for Auction Competition 
Dependent variable: auction closing price 
Independent variables Coefficients 
# of participants in the auction 1.103(0.010) ***     1.130(0.010) *** 
Retail price stated by auctioneer 0.016(0.000) *** -0.010(0.004) * 
Auction-type fixed effects Yes Yes 
Product-type fixed effects No Yes 
R-square 0.6882 0.7738 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** denotes significant at 0.001; * denotes significant at 0.05. 




Appendix E: The Conditional Expected Utility 
The conditional expected utility is expressed as: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝐸𝐸[𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 |𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 �𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔′ 𝐸𝐸[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖. 
For linear terms in the utility function, we simply have 𝐸𝐸[𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 |𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  and 𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1  through the 
Bayesian belief update. The conditional expectation of the covariates contained in 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔′ 𝐸𝐸[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔1𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 +
𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔2𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔3𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 
For the nonlinear term in the utility function, note that 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁 �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ,𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2 �. We write 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . 
Since 𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1 and 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟[𝑋𝑋] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋2] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋]2, the expectation for the closing price conditioned 
on the information set can be expressed as: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 �𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
= 𝐸𝐸 ��𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�
2�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
= 𝐸𝐸 �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 + �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1�
2 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 + 2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1� + 2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 2�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1�𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
= 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 + 𝐸𝐸 ��𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1�
2�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝐸𝐸�𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 �𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 2𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 �𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
= 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 + 𝐸𝐸 ��𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1�
2�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟�𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + �𝐸𝐸�𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖��
2 + 2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 − 2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12  
= 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 + 𝐸𝐸�(𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1)2�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
2 . 
Therefore, the conditional expected utility of user 𝑖𝑖 is expressed as: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝐸𝐸[𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 |𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 �𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜆𝜆𝑔𝑔′ 𝐸𝐸[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
= 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−12 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸 ��𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1�
2�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗
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